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Abstract 
 The collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of newly 
independent States marked the uprising of a new era in the region of the 
Caspian Basin. Failing to reach a consensus regarding the legal nature of the 
Caspian, Russia, Turkmenistan, Iran, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan’s policies 
have been characterized by a perpetual pursuit of establishing themselves as 
key-role agents in the region. The question about “Lake or Sea” is yet to be 
answered after many decades. This paper focuses on analyzing the 
significance of the Caspian Basin for the littoral States and how it determines 
their political agenda.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The Caspian Sea has been considered “a region of complexities” and 
has been characterized by a considerable heterogeneity in people, languages, 
and cultures (Gokay, 2001). The area in question has drawn a lot of attraction. 
Albeit, the cornerstone of its interest lies on the natural resources- especially 
oil reserves- situated on the Caspian basin. Having been regarded as a 
throughout-history oil producing region, the Caspian Sea tends to be an energy 
crossroad affecting the geopolitics of energy.  
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To begin with, the Caspian Sea is regarded as one of the most essential 
geopolitical and geostrategical regions of the world. It is a body of water, 
located in northwest Asia and is surrounded by five littoral States, namely 
Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan. Moreover, since it 
holds vast deposits of oil and gas resources, it is a vital supplier not only for 
Europe’s energy demand but for Asian’s markets too. According to US Energy 
Information Administration (henceforth EIA) in 2012, there were 292 trillion 
cubic feet (Tcf) of natural gas. However, it was estimated that 243 Tcf of 
natural gas is yet to be discovered (EIA, 2013). It is of paramount importance 
to stress the fact that the majority of the offshore oil deposits are situated on 
the Northern part of the Caspian Sea, whereas most of the offshore natural gas 
reserves are situated on the Southern part (EIA, 2013). In addition to this 
estimation, the U.S Geological Survey (henceforth USGS) claims that the 
region holds 19.6 billion bbl of undiscovered crude oil (USGS, 2010). As the 
world’s demand for oil and gas resources is foreseen to increase in the future 
and as energy consumption rises, the Caspian basin serves as a vital diversified 
energy source for many countries. 
The figure below depicts the oil and gas reserves in the Caspian Sea. 
The reserves have been estimated in both onshore and offshore of the Caspian 
basin. It can be concluded, by numbers, that Kazakhstan is the major player in 
the region as it holds almost 65% of crude oil (31.2 billion bbl) and 36% of 
natural gas (104 Tcf). Russia is the second important claimant in the Caspian 
Sea as it holds 13% of crude (6.1 billion bbl) oil and 37% of natural gas (109 
Tcf offshore and onshore). Furthermore, this is followed by Azerbaijan, 
Turkmenistan, and Iran. The most interesting observation is that Iran, which 
is one of the most significant oil producers in the world, has less oil and gas 
reserves in the region. In the table below, it is depicted by the letter “s” which 
means that the value is too small to be shown (EIA, 2013). 
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Figure 1. Source: U.S Energy Information Administration 
https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/regions-topics.cfm?RegionTopicID=CSR 
 
As it was mentioned before, the Caspian Sea is a body of water which 
can be characterized either as a land – locked sea or a border lake. On the one 
hand, legal experts claim that the Caspian Sea is a land – locked sea or 
enclosed sea due to its salty water, especially in its southern part (Ganjaliyen, 
2011- 2012). However, this is attributed to the fact that the only exits towards 
the open seas and oceans are through the Russia’s Volga River and the canals 
that connect it to the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea, and the Sea of Azov 
(Zimnitskaya & Geldern, 2011). On the other hand, the majority of geologist 
claims that the Caspian Sea is a border lake (Shafiyev, 2001), which is 
particularly the world’s largest lake (Ganjaliyen, 2011- 2012). Their 
classification as a border lake is due to the fact that the Caspian Sea is located 
on a basin, surrounded by five riparian States and, as it is not a part of the 
oceans, the only exit towards the open seas is through artificial canals. 
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As it may be concluded by the aforementioned, the Caspian Sea falls 
into the category of border lakes. It should be stressed that other lakes- such 
as the Lake Titicaca - have been classified as border lakes as well. According 
to International Law, the legal status of border lakes is determined either after 
consensus establishment among the riparian States or under the regime of 
condominium (Pawletta, 2015). However, the Lake Titicaca - border lake 
divided between Bolivia and Peru - consists of the only border lake under the 
regime of condominium (Pawletta, 2015). According to “Preliminary 
Convention between Peru and Bolivia Concerning a Study of the Joint 
Utilization of the Waters of Lake Titicaca”, it was stressed that “as regards 
the utilization of the waters of Lake Titicaca for industrial or other purposes, 
the two Governments declare that the said waters, being the joint and 
indivisible property of both, may be used only with the express agreement of 
the two parties” (Premilinary Convention, 1955).  
Except for the legal status of the Caspian basin, it is also important that 
the attitude of the five littoral States should be analyzed. 
 
RUSSIA 
Russia is one of the world’s leading natural resources’ producers. As a 
lot of its economy depends on oil and gas production, Russia does not want to 
be cut off from every possible oil and gas vat. According to EIA, Russia’s 
proved oil reserve were 80 billion barrels, in 2016, and are located majorly in 
West Siberia and in the Urals – Volga region, including the Caspian basin 
(EIA, 2016). Russia’s desire to play a crucial role in the supply chain of gas 
and oil towards European and Asian markets made it take control or at least 
be a part of every potential natural resource’s reservoir. This is the main reason 
why Russia changed its position, concerning the legal status of the Caspian 
Sea, several times throughout history.  
To begin with, during the empire of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (henceforth USSR), the only countries that shared the Caspian basin 
were the USSR and the Persian empire. Between these countries were signed 
several treaties regarding the legal status of the Caspian Sea. The first one was 
the “Treaty of Friendship between Persia and the Russian Socialist Federal 
Soviet Republic”, signed at Moscow on 26th February 1921 (henceforth the 
1921 Treaty). According to Article 1 of the 1921 Treaty, the Russian Republic 
stated that all the treaties, that both countries signed during the Tsarist 
Government “and crushed the rights of the Persian people”, were not valid 
(Article 1, 1921). Moreover, the treaty claimed that both States would have 
equal rights in the Caspian Sea including the right of free navigation under 
their flag (Article 11, 1921).  It is worth mentioning that despite the fact that 
this treaty does not regulate the legal status of the Caspian basin, as it did not 
mention the territorial sovereignty over it, it is of paramount importance in 
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light of the fact that it is the first time that equal rights have been recognized 
for both States.  
Furthermore, in 1940, both countries signed the “Treaty of Commerce 
and Navigation” (henceforth the 1940 treaty) which reaffirmed that only these 
countries should have rights on the Caspian Sea and all the third States were 
excluded and were restricted even from the right of innocent passage. Last but 
not least, both States claimed a 10 – mile zone among their coast only for 
fishing (Pawletta, 2007; Bahgat, 2007). After the signature of the 1940 treaty, 
the USSR and Iran called the Caspian Sea a “Shared Sea” (Institute of 
Mediterranean and Oriental Cultures Polish Academy of Sciences, 2014). 
Therefore, it can be said that it was the crucial document regarding the legal 
status of the Caspian basin. 
After the dissolution of the USSR, things changed and it became harder 
to agree on the basis of a unanimous decision about the legal status of the 
Caspian Sea and its delimitation. Additionally, the newly independent States, 
which are land-locked States (Land-locked States have no direct access to the 
high seas), wanted to participate in the natural resources of the basin.  
Russia, in the beginning, continued to insist that the above-mentioned 
treaties were valid. This is because the new States, which created the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, signed the Alma – Ata Declaration in 
1991. In its declaration, it was stated that the members of the Commonwealth 
are obliged to follow the treaties and agreements of the former USSR (Alma 
– Ata, 1991), but soon changed its position.  
This was the outcome of the new States’, and especially Azerbaijan’s 
claims which states that in the case of the USSR’s dissolution, the rebus sic 
stantibus doctrine was applied (Zimnitskaya & Geldern, 2011). Therefore, this 
means that the above mentioned treaties are no longer valid because there was 
a material change. Also, the Caspian Sea should be divided into five riparian 
States, and every State should be free to make agreements with foreign oil and 
gas companies. The most important for Russia’s policy was to have access to 
the Caspian Sea and to keep away, as far as possible, any non-riparian State. 
Hence, that is why, in 1996, it proposed a 45 mile coastal zone for every 
riparian States. In this zone, every State would have exclusive sovereign rights 
in the seabed, but the remaining part would be exploited by the five States 
(Bahgat, 2007). Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan refused to accept 
it and Russia started to sign bilateral agreements with the littoral States to 
delimitate the basin. 
In this part, it is important to state that in the agreements, the Caspian 
Sea is not classified either as a sea or a lake. Nevertheless, the participating 
parties wanted to sign a legal agreement in order to start the exploitation of the 
natural resources and to enhance the cooperation among them. 
 
European Scientific Journal September 2018 edition Vol.14, No.26 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
164 
IRAN 
Iran’s cornerstone of economy is oil production. Located on the 
crossroad of religions, sanctions, languages and energy routes, it has acquired 
survival skills throughout centuries. Iran’s oil reserves are estimated to be 400 
million barrels, while its gas reserves are estimated as 2 Tcf (EIA, 2015). 
Despite the fact that Iran does not possess a great abundance of reserves in the 
region of the Caspian Sea (EIA, 2013), the geographical location of Iran 
provides it with the capability of functioning as a key player among the land- 
locked States of the Caspian Sea (Bahgat, 2003). İn other words, the Caspian 
Sea could be rendered into a convenient and time-saving alternative to the 
always shifting background Persian Gulf.  
It is of utmost importance that an overview of Iran’s policy towards 
the Caspian Sea throughout the years should be given. After the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, the emergence of newly independent States led Iran to 
attempt to establish itself as the main agent of the Caspian region (Frappi & 
Garibov, 2014). Initially, the Islamic Republic of Iran urged that the Caspian 
Sea should be purported as res communis, which means that the particular 
region would be explored and exploited by the littoral States. In other words, 
the sea would be considered a common heritage of the riparian States 
(Zimnitskaya & Geldern, 2010). On the contrary, Iran advocated the need of 
condominium principle instead of the division of the Caspian Sea in national 
sectors (Abilov, 2011).  
However, Iran’s stance was altered in view of the emergence of new 
interests and stakes in the region (Abilov, 2011). In its attempt to obtain a 
larger portion of oil revenues, Iran had advocated for Caspian Sea’s division 
in national sectors. What should be pointed out here is the fact that Iran have 
stressed that the Caspian Sea ought to be divided into five equal parts (Abilov, 
2011). Despite the fact that Iran’s gas reserves in the Caspian basin reached 2 
Tcf, little do they contribute to the nation’s total reserves (EIA, 2015). The 
strategic importance of Iran’s particular attitude is threefold. Tehran will try 
to be established as a “Great Power of a New Great Game” in the region of the 
Caspian Sea, outbalance the risks in the Persian Gulf and, at the same time, 
prevent the militarization of the Caspian Sea as well as USA’s presence in the 
region. Iran’s stance alteration is compatible with the general alteration in 
Iran’s policy, which tends not to be as adamant as it is in the past decades.  
 
AZERBAIJAN 
Located on the crossroad of Europe and Asia, Azerbaijan is of great 
geopolitical importance despite its small size (Frappi & Garibov, 2014). As it 
can be deduced by the chart below, Azerbaijan has been regarded as a key-
role player in the region of the Caspian Sea since 2006, which was entailed in 
the foundation of the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli (ACG) field group between the 
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years 2006 and 2008 (EIA, 2013). In addition, their total production in the first 
half of 2017 reached 585,000 barrels per day (BP, 2017).  
 
Figure 2. Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, IHS EDIN, Eastern Bloc 
Energy, Rigzone, and Rystad Energy, 
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=12911, accessed on 08/02/2017 
 
Regarding Azerbaijan’s claims over the Caspian Sea, it is prominent 
in its Constitution (Constitution of Azerbaijan Republic, 1995) that “Internal 
waters of the Azerbaijan Republic, sector of the Caspian Sea (lake) belonging 
to the Azerbaijan Republic, air space over the Azerbaijan Republic, are 
integral parts of the territory of the Azerbaijan Republic”. In the light of this, 
Azerbaijan has rendered the exploitation of the Caspian’s resources into the 
cornerstone of its policy (Zimnitskaya & Geldern, 2010).  
Hence, unlike Islamic Republic of Iran, Azerbaijan has been adamant 
to its claims over Caspian division in nation sectors by UNCLOS in regards 
to the Caspian Sea. At the same time, Azerbaijan has refused to accept the 
Soviet- Iranian Treaties of 1921 and 1940 on the grounds that they are only 
applicable to navigation and fishing issues, and do not include the newly 
independent States of the Caspian (Abilov, 2011).  
In addition to what has been already mentioned, the fact that 
Azerbaijan has signed numerous agreements with energy companies regarding 
resource exploitation in its seabed and subsoil entails the establishment of a 
de facto status quo in the region (Frappi & Garibov, 2014). Furthermore, 
UNCLOS application to the Caspian Sea would serve as an opportunity for 
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KAZAKHSTAN 
The next littoral State is Kazakhstan, which is a significant global oil 
and gas producer. According to the world factbook of the Central Intelligence 
Agency (henceforth CIA), Kazakhstan geographically is a land-locked State 
in Central Asia, and more specifically, it is the largest land-locked country in 
the world (CIA, 2017), bordered by Russia, China, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan, and the Caspian Sea. 
The vast majority of Kazakhstan’s deposits is located on the western 
part of the country, offshore, and onshore of the Caspian Sea. Kazakhstan has 
four main natural resources’ production fields, namely Tengiz field, 
Karachaganak field, Kurmangazy field, and Kashagan field (Kaiser & 
Pulsipher, 2007). Thus, the first two together provides half of the country’s 
production (EIA, 2017). The Kazakh fields are necessary for the State’s 
economy and according to the Ministry of Energy of Kazakhstan, the country, 
in 2015, exported 79.5 million tonnes of oil and condensate (Government of 
the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2016).  Kazakhstan’s main export roots are Italy, 
China, Netherlands, Russia, and France (Trading Economics, 2017). One of 
the most important reasons for this is that Kazakhstan tries to have diversified 
energy markets so as not to depend on Russia. 
As we concluded from the above-mentioned, the unsolved legal status 
of the Caspian Sea affects Kazakhstan too. Kazakhstan, like Azerbaijan, 
refuses to accept the Soviet- Iranian Treaties of 1921 and 1940 (UN A/52/424, 
1997) and leans to believe that the Caspian basin should be classified as a sea 
and more specifically as an enclosed or semi enclosed sea. Furthermore, the 
delimitation should be made according to the median line. The utmost 
important thing of that approach is that the delimitation concerns only the 
seabed of the Caspian basin and not the surface water. For the surface water, 
it is believed that the proper solution is the principle of res communis usus of 
all the riparian States (Shafiyev, 2001).  
Kazakhstan, all these years, is stable to this opinion and it made 
bilateral treaties with Russia, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan in order to settle 
down the tensions and the disputes in the region. In 1998, Kazakhstan and 
Russia signed an agreement, “On the Delimitation of the Seabed of the 
Northern Part of the Caspian Sea for the Purpose of Exercising their 
Sovereign Rights to the Exploitation of its Subsoil”, dividing the northern part 
of the seabed and subsoil by the method of the median line and referring to the 
common use of the surface waters (UN A/52/983, 1998). Three years later, in 
2001, Kazakhstan signed a similar agreement with Azerbaijan. According to 
Article 1 of the agreement, the States will use the median line to divide the 
seabed and subsoil of the Caspian basin, but there is no reference to the waters 
(Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan Republic on 
Differentiation of Bottom of the Caspian Sea, 2001). In this part, it should be 
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mentioned that these agreements are not an obstacle in case the littoral States 
decides to achieve consensus on the legal status of the basin. 
 
TURKMENISTAN 
Last but not least, Turkmenistan is also a former Soviet Republic State 
which holds vast deposits of natural resources. Like the above-mentioned 
country, Turkmenistan is also a land-locked State, located in Central Asia and 
bordered by Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and the Caspian Sea. 
Since its independence, Turkmenistan became one of the most significant gas 
producers and is the world’s fourth largest exporter of natural gas (Hellenic 
Shipping News, 2016). Moreover, Turkmenistan is believed to hold huge 
deposits of natural resources, especially natural gas, which have not been 
explored yet; hence, it was stated that its potential gas reserves are equal to the 
ones of Saudi Arabia (Kubicek, 2013).  
In 2012, Turkmenistan produced 69 billion cubic meters of natural gas 
(Safirova, 2015). Also, in 2015, Turkmenistan confirmed his reputation as a 
leading gas producer, as it produced more than 2.5 Tcf of dry natural gas and 
exported 1.3 Tcf of natural gas the same year (EIA, 2016). As long as 
Turkmenistan contains several large natural fields, such as Dauletabad and 
Shatlyk (Bahgat, 2007), which are located all over its territory among the 
Caspian Sea, and the exports of the resources are up to 25% of the State’s GDP 
(CIA, 2017), it is obvious that the paradox of the legal status of the Caspian 
Sea affects its policy. 
Turkmenistan never had a stable position regarding the Caspian Sea, 
but it changed its position several times since its independence. Initially, in 
1996, it supported the 45 mile coastal zone that Russia claimed (Bahgat, 2007). 
One year later, Turkmenistan wanted the Caspian Sea, both seabed and 
surface, to be divided (Shafiyev, 2001). In 1997, Turkmenistan’s president and 
the president of Kazakhstan made a joint statement which stated that “Until 
the Caspian States reach an agreement on the status of the Caspian Sea, the 
parties will adhere to the delimitation of administrative and territorial borders 
along a line running through the middle of the Sea" (UN A/52/424, 1997). 
However, just only a year later, Turkmenistan changed its opinion again and 
switched to Iran’s side. Turkmenistan claimed that the Caspian basin should 
be divided equally by using the condominium principle and that every State 
should take 20% of the region. Moreover, in 1998, the two States in a joint 
statement claimed that “Until the finalization of the new legal regime, the 
Treaty on Friendship between Iran and Russia of 1921 and the Agreement on 
Trade and Shipping between Iran and the Soviet Union of 1940 are the sole 
international documents governing legal issues relating to the Caspian Sea” 
(UN A/53/453, 1998). Finally, in 2000, in its letter addressed to the UN 
secretary General, Turkmenistan was in favor of the division by the sectoral 
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approach and stated that the surrounding States should cooperate on a mutual 
basis (UN A/55/309, 2000). 
In this part, it is worth saying that, in 2003, all the five littoral States 
signed the “Framework Convention for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment of the Caspian Sea” in order to protect the Caspian basin. 
According to the Convention, all States should take the appropriate measures 
and should cooperate with each other in order to prevent, reduce, and control 
pollution of the Caspian Sea (Framework Convention for the Protection of the 
Marine Environment of the Caspian Sea, 2003). Although this is a Convention 
which concern the environment and its protection, it can be said that maybe it 
is the first step, among all the riparian States, towards a consensus on the legal 
status of the Caspian basin. 
 
POSSIBLE SCENARIOS 
Despite the fact that the establishment of the legal status of the Caspian 
basin lies on the determination of the riparian States, it is essential to analyze 
the possible scenarios. The first scenario includes the Caspian basin being 
categorized as sea. Supposing that the littoral States have ratified UNCLOS 
1982, UNCLOS would regulate the regime of the sea in the Caspian Sea. 
Under UNCLOS 1982, territorial sea is a term used to describe a belt of sea 
adjacent to a coastal or archipelagic state where the sovereignty of the coastal 
or archipelagic state is extended. Each state is entitled to establishing the 
breadth of its territorial sea (extended to the air space over it and to its bed and 
subsoil as well) up to 12 nautical miles measured from baselines. Under 
UNCLOS 1982, all States are entitled to innocent passage through the 
territorial sea. 
The next maritime zone that a coastal State may claim is the Exclusive 
Economic Zone (hereinafter EEZ). According to UNLCOS 1982, Part V of 
the Convention, EEZ may be extended until 200nm from the baselines. 
Therefore, this refers to the rights, jurisdiction, and duties of both coastal and 
third States. Every coastal States can exercise its sovereign rights for research 
and exploitation purposes up to 200nm (UNCLOS, 1982). 
Prior to the analysis of Continental Shelf, it should be noted that the 
particular maritime zone is considered to be the second most substantial 
maritime zone after territorial sea in view of the fact that most natural 
resources tend to be found in the particular area (Churchill & Lowe, 1988). 
According to UNCLOS 1982, Article 77 states that “The coastal State 
exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of 
exploring it and exploiting its natural resources”. The rights that the 
Continental Shelf generates are exclusive; this means that if the coastal State 
does not explore them or exploit its natural resources, no one may undertake 
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these activities without the express consent of the coastal State (UNCLOS, 
1982). 
It is important to mention here that according to UNCLOS, every 
country has ipso facto and ab initio its Continental Shelf, but it has to declare 
its intention to delimit its EEZ. Naturally, a great deal of maritime disputes in 
the Caspian Sea region is possible to stem from such rule in view of the States’ 
intention to acquire more area to be exploited.  
Furthermore, the Caspian Sea would fall into the category of enclosed 
or semi- enclosed seas. According to Article 122 of UNCLOS 1982, enclosed 
or semi- enclosed sea is defined as a basin or sea surrounded by two or more 
States and is connected to another sea or ocean by a narrow outlet. Littoral 
States surrounding enclosed or semi-enclosed sea are called geographically 
disadvantaged States. However, it is worth pointing out the fact that a variety 
of problems and issues are caused primarily by management, conservation and 
exploration of resources of the sea – either living or not – issues of 
international navigation as well as pollution issues (Tanaka, 2012). It goes 
without saying that the matter of resource exploitation is the most prominent. 
In case that the Caspian Sea is considered to be a lake, there will be 
two possible scenarios. A term being particularly stressed in such cases is 
condominium. Under this notion, the riparian States are entitled to equal 
sovereign rights (Frappi & Garibov, 2014). In other words, condominium 
signalizes the fact that each of the five riparian States would acquire 20% of 
the total region of the Caspian Sea. Furthermore, when it comes to the 
exploitation, resources are administrated jointly by the riparian countries. 
However, in the case of the Caspian Sea, condominium is not feasible to apply 
due to the discords that have risen.  
On the contrary, according to a second possible scenario, the Caspian 
Basin may be divided by the use of the median line. In that case, the 
importance of the equidistance principle should be stressed. However, this 
scenario would entail in specific States (Iran in particular) acquiring larger 
share of the basin. Consequently, the riparian States are entitled to exploiting 
exclusively their national sectors. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Despite what scholar society may advocate, the legal status of the 
Caspian basin is not about to be established in a short term. The absence of 
consensus among the riparian States stems from conflicting national interests. 
The rivalries among the States and the pursuit of each state to establish its 
order of regulation are bound to continue. However, the bone of contention is 
not the establishment of the legal status in the basin, but the perpetual question 
“Who controls the resources?” In other words, the ultimate goal is not to 
legally define the water of the Caspian Sea, but to define and determine who 
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participates in the exploitation of the resources. This can be reflected by the 
fact that most riparian States of the Caspian Sea have already had companies 
export oil. In addition, large portion of their economy depends on the revenues 
from the oil and gas resources. However, what should be borne in mind is 
whether the particular situation will be led to resolution among the States or it 
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